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Abstract
A value of a game v is a function which to each coalition S assigns the value v(S) of
this coalition, meaning the expected pay-o for players in that coalition. A classical
approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern [6] had set some formal requirements on
v which contemporary theories of value adhere to. A Shapley value of the game with
a value v [14] is a functional  giving for each player p the value 
p
(v) estimating the
expected pay{o of the player p in the game. Game as well as conict theory have
been given recently much attention on the part of rough and fuzzy set communities
[11,8,1,4,7,2]. In particular, problems of plausible strategies [1] in conicts as well
as problems related to Shapley's value [3,2] have been addressed.
We confront here the problem of estimating a value as well as Shapley's value of
a game from a partial data about the game. We apply to this end the rough set
ideas of approximations, dening the lower and the upper value of the game and,
respectively, the lower and the upper Shapley value. We also dene a notion of an
exact coalition, on which both values coincide giving the true value of the game; we
investigate the structure of the family of exact sets showing its closeness on comple-
ments, disjoint sums, and intersections of coalitions covering the set of players. This
work sets open a new area of rough set applications in mining constructs from data.
The constructs mined in this case are values as well as Shapley values of games.
Key words: Rough sets, the lower and the upper value (Shapley
value) of a game, coalition, exact coalition.
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1 Introduction
We begin with some preliminaries. First, rudiments of rough sets.
1.1 Rough Sets
The idea of a rough set [9] has to do with concept approximation. Given
an information system (i.e. a data table) in the form of a pair I
S
= (U;A)
where U is a (usually nite) set of objects and A is a (usually nite) set of
attributes (an attribute a 2 A meaning a function a : U ! V
a
with V
a
the
value set of a, the fundamental entity is the indiscernibility relation IND
A
=
f(x; y) 2 U
2
: 8a 2 A:a(x) = a(y)g. Objects x; y with (x; y) 2 IND
A
are
indiscernible; in consequence, giv ena concept Q  U , there are two cases:
either Q is expressible in terms of IND
A
i.e. Q =
S
f[x]
IND
A
: x 2 Qg in
which case we say Q is exact or otherwise, Q is then rough. In case of a rough
concept Q, one may approximate Q with two exact concepts viz.
Q =
[
f[x]
IND
A
: [x]
IND
A
 Qg (lower approximation)(1)
Q =
[
f[x]
IND
A
: [x]
IND
A
[Q 6= ;g (upper approximation):(2)
Then clearly Q  Q  Q cf.[10].
Let us observe that approximations introduced abov e are dened in terms
of set operations of containment and intersection. In the sequel we start with
functions on exact sets and we extend them to arbitrary sets using rough set
approximations.
1.2 Game theory notions
A game G consists of a set P of players, a set ST of strategies, and a pay{
o w. A choice  : P ! ST of strategies b y play ers denes a play of
the game and the pay{o w(; p) for the play er p in the play . A classi-
cal analysis of two{play er p; q non{cooperative zero{sum games b yvon Neu-
mann [6] brought forth the minimax the or emshowing the existence of opti-
mal mixed strategies 

; 

for both play ers satisfying min

max

w(; ; p) =
w(

; 

; p) = max

min

w(; ; p). This analysis was extended [5] to coop er-
ative games in which play ers are allowed to merge their strategies by forming
coalitions; under the zero{sum assumptions, given a coalition S  P play-
ing against the coalition P n S, the value v(S) of the coalition S was dened
as the optimal pay{o w(

; 

; S) to S in two{player S; P n S game with
w(:; S) =
P
fw(:; p) : p 2 Sg. Then the function v(S) on coalitions satises
the conditions:
v(;) = 0(3)
v(S [ T )  v(S) + v(T ) in case S \ T = ; (hyperadditivity)(4)
v(S)  v(T ) in case S  T:(5)
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In contemporary generalizations of classical results, b y a game with the set
P = fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g of play ers is understood a function v : 2
P
! R
+
= fr 2 R :
r  0g satisfying the condition v(;) = 0. The set G(P ) of games with the set
P of players is then a 2
n
 1{dimensional vector space of functionals generated
b ya basis of the form fv
T
(S) = Æ
TS
: ; 6= T  Pg where Æ
TS
is equal to 1 in
case T  S and 0, otherwise.
Given a game v where v(S) is interpreted as the expected pay{o for the
coalition S in the game v, the problem of evaluating the expected pay o for an
individual play erwas giv en a solution in [14] in theform of the Shapley value
of a game. The Shapley value of the game is a functional  on G(P ) with
values in R
n
such that the p{th coordinate (v)
p
is the expected pay{o for
the play erp in the game v. The denition of the Shapley value is as follows:
(v)
p
=
X
p2S
(n  jSj)!(jSj   1)!
n!
(v(S)  v(S n fpg):(6)
We assume, in accordance with a common practice, e.g.[2], that all values
considered are non{negative.
2 Estimating a value of a game
We address here a follo wing problem. In many cases like market games, pro-
duction games etc. [12,13] play ers participating in a game oer their resources
in coalitions, entering plays of the game, however the payo is diÆcult to be
estimated due to complexity of the game and many factors determining the
pay o,many of which are beyond control. As the number of coalition struc-
tures grows doubly exponentially with the number of players, it is impossible
to explore all possible coalition structures when a n umber of players is large.
Assuming the players may take part in a nite number of plays, forming some
coalition structures, the recorded values of pay{os are the only information
about the game.
We propose an analysis of this record on rough set lines in order to dene
approximations to the value of the game.
We assume that the information about a game, v, is giv enin the form of
an information system IS(v) = (P;A) with P = f1; 2; : : : ; ng being the set
of objects (= play ers) numbered b y 1; 2; : : : ; n respectively and A the set of
attributes, A = fS
1
; : : : ;S
k
g, each S
i
being a coalition structure i.e. a partition
of players into coalitions. The value S
i
(j) = v
ij
is the pay{o to the coalition
of the play er j under the coalition structure S
i
.
We assume the following strategy for recov ering coalitions forming the
coalition structure S
i
: we dene the indiscernibility relation IND
i
= f(j; k) :
v
ij
= v
ik
and we adopt its classes of equivalence as coalitions S
i1
; : : : ; S
im(i)
2
S
i
. The valuev(S
ik
) of the coalition S
ik
is then the valuev
ij
for any j 2 S
ik
.
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2.1 The lower value v
 
We dene the game v
 
(S) by letting rst
v
j
 
(S) =
X
S
jk
S
v(S
jk
)(7)
The follo wing propertiesof the lower game follow from the denition.
Proposition 2.1 The following ar etrue:
v
j
 
(;) = 0(8)
S  T ) v
j
 
(S)  v
j
 
(T ) (monotonicity).(9)
S \ T = ; ) v
j
 
(S [ T )  v
j
 
(S) + v
j
 
(T ) (h yperadditivity).(10)
v
j
 
(P ) =
X
i
v
j
ij
:(11)
Proof. Properties (8), (11) are manifest. Property (9) follows by transitivity
of set inclusion, while (10) holds because of possible existence of coalitions S
jk
which are contained in S [ T being contained neither in S nor in T . 2
Having dened v
j
 
(S) for each 1  j  k, we now dene the lower game
v
 
as the expected uniform value of all v
j
 
(S)'s, i.e.
v
 
(S) =
1
k

X
j
v
j
 
(S)(12)
Then clearly properties stated in Proposition 2.1 may be extended straight-
forwardly to properties of the lower game v
 
.
Proposition 2.2 The following are true
v
 
(;) = 0(13)
S  T ) v
 
(S)  v
 
(T ) (monotonicity).(14)
S \ T = ; ) v
 
(S [ T )  v
 
(S) + v
 
(T ) (h yperadditivity).(15)
v
 
(P ) =
X
i
v
ij
:(16)
2.2 The upper value v
+
(S)
We dene the upper game v
+j
(S) b y using the idea of in tersection and thus
b y letting
v
+j
(S) =
X
S
jk
\S 6=;
v(S
jk
)(17)
for each 1  j  k.
Then we dene the upper game v
+
as the expected value of games v
+j
:
v
+
(S) =
1
k

X
j
v
+j
(S):(18)
The following properties of the game v
+j
parallel those of Proposition 2.1.
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Proposition 2.3 The following ar etrue
v
+j
(;) = 0(19)
 T ) v
+j
(S)  v
+j
(T ) (monotonicity)(20)
S \ T = ; ) v
+j
(S [ T )  v
+j
(S) + v
+j
(T ) (subadditivity)(21)
v
+j
(P ) =
X
i
v
ij
:(22)
Proof. Properties (19), (22) are manifest. Property (20) follows b y mono-
tonicity of set in tersection, while (21) holds because of coalitions S
jk
which
intersect both S and T as they are counted once in v
+j
(S [T ) but they count
twice in v
+j
(S) + v
+j
(T ). 2
We put for the record the follo wing property:
v
j
 
(S)  v
+j
(S) for each S  P:(23)
As with the lower v alue, here also Proposition 2.3 valid for each j extends
to
Proposition 2.4 v
+
(;) = 0(24)
S  T ) v
+
(S)  v
+
(T ) (monotonicity)(25)
S \ T = ; ) v
+
(S [ T )  v
+
(S) + v
+
(T ) (subadditivity)(26)
v
+
(P ) =
X
i
v
ij
:(27)
We also notice the follo wing relationship
v
 
(S)  v
+
(S) for each S  P:(28)
Let us observe that each game v which is h yperadditive is monotone as well:
in case S  T , we hav eT = S [ (T n S) hence v(T )  v(S) + v(T n S) hence
v(T )  v(S) as v(T n S)  0.
This observation allows us to state the following
Proposition 2.5 Assume that the estimated game v is additive (i.e. v(S [
T ) = v(S) + v(T ) in case S \ T = ;) so it is monotone. Then
v
 
(S)  v(S)  v
+
(S) for each S  P:(29)
Proof. As for each j we hav e v
j
 
(S) =
P
v(S
jk
)
= v(
S
fS
jk
: S
jk
 Sg 
v(S)  v(
S
fS
jk
: S
jk
\ S 6= ;g =
P
S
jk
\S 6=;
v(S
jk
) = v
+j
(S), the inequality
v
j
 
(S)  v(S)  v
+j
(S) extends to the inequality v
 
(S)  v(S)  v
+j
(S). 2
2.3 Exact coalitions
The idea of an exact set may be rendered in game theory b y introducing a
notion of an exact coalition.
A coalition S  P is exact if and only if
v
 
(S) = v
+
(S):(30)
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It follo wsb yProposition 2.5 that (30) implies v(S) = v
 
(S) = v
+
(S). Thus
on exact sets the valueof the game is dened exactly.
The structure of the family E of exact coalitions is weaker than the struc-
ture of exact sets in rough set theory but the two do share some important
properties.
Proposition 2.6 We have
;; P 2 E(31)
If S; T 2 E and S \ T = ;; then S [ T 2 E(32)
If S 2 E then P n S 2 E(33)
If S [ T = P and S; T 2 E then S \ T 2 E :(34)
Proof. (31) follows from (16) and (27). For (32), assume that S; T are exact
with S\T = ;. Then v(S)+v(T ) = v
 
(S)+v
 
(T )  v
 
(S[T )  v
+
(S[T ) 
v
+
(S) + v
+
(T ) = v(S) + v(T ) hence v
 
(S [ T ) = v
+
(S [ T ) i.e. S [ T 2 E .
For (33), we take a roundabout way: rst, we observe that v
 
(S) = v
+
(S)
implies by (23) that v
j
 
(S) = v
+j
(S). Therefore v
j
 
(P nS) =
P
S jkPnS
v(S
jk
)
= v(P ) 
P
S
jk
\S 6=;
= v(P ) 
P
S
jk
S
v(S
jk
) =
P
S
jk
\(PnS) 6=;
v(S
jk
) = v
+j
(P n
S). A fortiori, v
 
(P n S) = v
+
(P n S) i.e. P n S 2 E .
Finally, for (34), we assume that S [ T = P for S; T 2 E . As (P n
S) \ (P n T ) = ;, and b y (33), P n S; P n T 2 E , b y (32) we hav e that
P n (S \ T ) = (P n S) [ (P n T ) 2 E and so, b y(33), S \ T 2 E . 2
Remark 2.7 Results proved abov e demonstrate that exact sets form a sound
set{algebraic structure on which the value of an additive game may be dened
exactly b ymeans of rough set tec hniques.
3 The Shapley v alueof the game
We now look at the Shapley value of the game. We pursue the course entered
in the previous section and we consider Shapley values respective two games:
the lower and the upper in troducedabov e.
3.1 The lower Shapley value
We consider the lower game v
 
and for this game we analyze the corresponding
Shapley value. It follows from the formula (6) that crucial for this value for
the player j is the factor v
 
(S)  v
 
(S n fjg) where j 2 S  P .
We hav e a formula for this expression; for a coalition structure S
i
, a play er
j, and a coalition S, we denote with the symbol S
i
( j) the element of S
i
satisfying j 2 S
i
( j)  S if it exists. We hav e
Proposition 3.1 F orS
i
, j, and S as introduced above, the formula holds
v
 
(S)  v
 
(S n fjg) =
1
k

k
X
i=1
v(S
i
( j):(35)
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Proof. Fixing i, and looking at v
i
 
(S)  v
i
 
(S n fjg) we have:
v
i
 
(S)  v
i
 
(S n fjg) =
X
S
ik
S
v(S
ik
) 
X
S
ik
Snfjg
v(S
ik
) =
=
X
j2S
ik
S
v(S
ik
) = v(S
i
( j)):
T akinginto account the formula (12), we arrive at (35) to be prov ed. 2
Therefore
Proposition 3.2 The Shapley value induced by the lower game v
 
is a vector
[
j
(v
 
)]
n
j=1
whose j   th coor dinateis given by

j
(v
 
) =
1
k

X
j2SP
(n  jSj)!(jSj   1)!
n!
k
X
i=1
v(S
i
( j)):(36)
Proof. The formula (36) follows from formulae (6) and (35). 2
3.2 The upper Shapley value
The analysis of the Shapley value induced by the upper game v
+
follo ws same
lines as that of the lower Shapley value above. F or acoalition structure S
i
, a
player j, and a coalition S, we denote with the symbol S
i
(+j) the element of
S
i
satisfying S
i
(+j) \ S = fjg if it exists. The counterpart of (35) holds.
Proposition 3.3 F orS
i
, j, and S as introduced above, the formula holds
v
+
(S)  v
+
(S n fjg) =
1
k

k
X
i=1
v(S
i
(+j):(37)
Proof. The proof parallels the proof of Proposition 35. 2
In consequence, we hav e a formula for the upper Shapley value.
Proposition 3.4 The Shapley value induced by the upper game v
+
is a vector
[
j
(v
+
)]
n
j=1
whose j   th coordinate is given by

j
(v
+
) =
1
k

X
j2SP
(n  jSj)!(jSj   1)!
n!
k
X
i=1
v(S
i
(+j)):(38)
Proof. The formula (38) follows from formulae (6) and (37). 2
Remark 3.5 Formulae (36) and (38) give a local description of Shapley's val-
ues agreeing with intuition. A combinatorial analysis of relationships between
the lower and the upper Shapley values will be a subject of further research.
3.3 Example
We giv e a simple example ofa system IS(v) presented in Table 1 abov e.
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no. S
1
S
2
S
3
1 1 1 2
2 1 2 1
3 3 1 1
4 3 2 2
Table 1
Coalition structures and pay{os for players 1; 2; 3; 4.
Example 3.6 The information system IS(v) with P = f1; 2; 3; 4g and coali-
tion structures S
1
;S
2
;S
3
.
From the table, we infer coalition structures: S
1
= f(1; 2); (3; 4)g; S
2
=
f(1; 3); (2; 4)g; S
3
= f(1; 4); (2; 3)g.
F ollo wing (12) and(18), we may calculate the upper and the lower values
arriving at:
v
 
(;) = 0 = v
+
(;);
v
 
(j) = 0 for j = 1; 2; 3; 4;
v
+
(1) =
4
3
; v
+
(2) =
4
3
; v
+
(3) =
5
3
; v
+
(4) =
7
3
;
v
 
(1; 2) =
1
3
; v
 
(1; 4) =
2
3
; v
 
(1; 3) =
1
3
; v
 
(2; 3) =
1
3
; v
 
(2; 4) =
2
3
;
v
 
(3; 4) = 1;
v
+
(1; 2) =
7
3
; v
+
(1; 4) = 3; v
+
(1; 3) =
81
3
; v
+
(2; 3) =
8
3
; v
+
(2; 4) = 3;
v
+
(3; 4) = 3;
v
 
(1; 2; 3) = 1; v
 
(1; 2; 4) =
5
3
; v
 
(1; 3; 4) = 2; v
 
(2; 3; 4) = 2;
v
+
(1; 2; 3) =
10
3
; v
+
(1; 2; 4) =
10
3
; v
+
(1; 3; 4) =
10
3
; v
+
(2; 3; 4) =
10
3
;
v
 
(1; 2; 3; 4) =
10
3
= v
+
(1; 2; 3; 4).
Finally, we employ formulae (36) and (38) with j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g to calculate
v ectors [
j
(v
 
)]
j
, [
j
(v
+
)]
j
. We obtain:
[
j
(v
 
)]
j
=

48
72
;
48
72
;
60
72
;
84
72

and


j
(v
+
)

j
=

48
72
;
48
72
;
60
72
;
84
72

:
It follows that we may accept as the Shapley value (v) the v ector

48
72
;
48
72
;
60
72
;
84
72

:
3.4 The lower Shapley value = the upper Shapley value
In Example above, the lower and the upper Shapley valueswere identical. A
question may arise whether the two, although calculated from two distinct
game values, can be equal.It turns out to be so.
Proposition 3.7 We have [
j
(v
 
)]
j
= [
j
(v
+
)]
j
.
Proof.
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We refer to formulae (36), (38). We assume that j 2 C 2 S
i
and C  S 
P . The contribution of C; S to 
j
(v
 
) is the term
(n jSj)!(jSj 1)!
n!
v(C). Consider
a coalition S
0
= (P n S) [ fjg. Clearly, C \ S
0
= fjg. Thus C; S
0
contribute
to 
j
(v
+
) the term
(n jS
0
j)!(jS
0
j 1)!
n!
v(C). As jS
0
j = n  jSj+ 1; we hav e
(n  jS
0
j)!(jS
0
j   1)!
n!
v(C) =
(n  jSj)!(jSj   1)!
n!
v(C)(39)
i.e. contributions of C; S respectively C; S
0
to respectively 
j
(v
 
), 
j
(v
+
))
are equal. As the correspondence S $ S
0
is a bijection, from supersets of
C to sets intersecting C on j, each coalition structure contributes to either
Shapley value the same amount. Thus the lower and the upper Shapley values
coincide. 2
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